The code runs as a standard Linux process. Seccomp acts as a strict allowlist filter, reducing the set of permitted system calls. However, any allowed syscall still executes directly against the shared host kernel. Once a syscall is permitted, the kernel code processing that request is the exact same code used by the host and every other container. The failure mode here is that a vulnerability in an allowed syscall lets the code compromise the host kernel, bypassing the namespace boundaries.
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The experiment methodology left me dubious about the kind of point they wanted to make. Why not provide the agent with the ISA documentation? Why Rust? Writing a C compiler is exactly a giant graph manipulation exercise: the kind of program that is harder to write in Rust. Also, in a clean room experiment, the agent should have access to all the information about well established computer science progresses related to optimizing compilers: there are a number of papers that could be easily synthesized in a number of markdown files. SSA, register allocation, instructions selection and scheduling. Those things needed to be researched *first*, as a prerequisite, and the implementation would still be “clean room”.
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"It was a lot of trial and error."